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Abstract 
Most of the research work concerning the French tableau de bord tends to locate its birth in industrial 
companies with engineers as lead roles and the State as supporting role (Lebas, 1996). Yet, a study in the 
Crédit Lyonnais archives shows that banks are not unequipped with this kind of managerial device. We 
have studied the period of birth and first development of the Crédit Lyonnais that is from 1870 to 1890. 
This period is characterized by the expansion of local branches, by the internationalisation of the bank 
and by the diversification of activities (Bouvier, 1961; Dagneau, 2003). Corporate managers then needed 
more information to control and compare their branches and activities. At the same time, and as a 
consequence of this quick growth, overhead expenses exploded. Therefore, the top management asked for 
more information, not only accounting information but also data concerning the number of clients per 
day, the number of complaints and the number of letters written to answer them, the number of market 
orders, etc. At the beginning, this form of tableau de bord was not very well formalised but, gradually, 
the management asked for more data in the shape of tables or cards. Comparisons year by year were also 
expected from branches. Furthermore, the Crédit Lyonnais corporate managers claimed for obtaining the 
same data than other French banks such as the Société Générale.  In this paper, we will relate the 
apparition and progress of non accounting data as a precocious hint of the French tableau de bord. We 
will also describe the external and internal conditions of this apparition and progress.  
 
This paper was written in English by non Anglophone scholars. We apologize for 
language mistakes; we will correct them later. We have preferred to respect the 
conference deadline.  
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As Billings and Capie (2004: 317) stated, “there is a perception that, in the British banks 
which dominated the industry for  much of the twentieth century, management 
accounting was limited in scope and  contributed to a general inefficiency in these 
institutions. Various official reports published from the 1960s until very recently have 
reinforced this view. However, some authors have argued that the banks were more 
sophisticated in their  management than such criticisms would imply”. The same 
perception exists in France and is maybe strengthened by the particular role devoted to 
engineers in French management regarding the supposed weakness of accountants 
(Berland, Boyns, 2002; Lebas, 1996). Budgeting and management accounting are 
considered as innovations that took place in the large  industrial companies. The 
literature on French  tableaux de bord has explicitly or implicitly acknowledged the 
powerful role of engineers in  (Bessire & Baker, 2005; Bourguignon  et al., 2004; 
Epstein & Manzoni, 1997; Lebas, 1996, Gray & Pesqueux, 1993). Even the instigators 
of the balanced scorecard has accredited the French and engineering origin of their 
managerial innovation: 
“While the phrase balanced scorecard was coined in the early 1990s, the roots of 
the this type of approach are deep, and include the pioneering work of General 
Electric on performance measurement reporting in the 1950’s and the work of 
French process engineers (who created the Tableau de Bord  – literally, a 
"dashboard" of performance measures) in the early part of the 20th century”
3. 
This unusually unanimous “common sense” deserves to be questioned.  
A thorough investigation in industrial companies’ archives has demonstrated that the 
role of engineers in the implementation of tableaux de bord was more restricted than 
expected (Pezet, 2007). This primary breakthrough has brought us to scrutinize the 
archives of one of the major French banks, the Crédit Lyonnais.  The choice of the 
Crédit Lyonnais is particularly relevant for two main reasons. First, it was one of the 
main French banks at this period. Second, at the head of the bank, Henri Germain, the 
founder of the Crédit Lyonnais, “theorized” its practices (Praquin, 2005). Indeed, he had 
a real reflexive thought about the management methods he used. Our investigation  in 
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the Crédit Lyonnais archives  has showed that banks were not unequipped with 
innovative managerial device.  
We have studied the period of birth and first development of the Crédit Lyonnais that is 
from 1870 to 1890. This period is characterized by the expansion of local branches, by 
the internationalisation of the bank and by the diversification of activities (Bouvier, 
1961; Dagneau, 2003). Corporate managers then needed more information to control 
and compare their branches and activities. At the same time, and as a consequence of 
this  rapid growth, overhead expenses  increased dramatically. Therefore, the top 
management asked for more information, not only accounting information but also data 
concerning the number of clients per day, the number of complaints and the number of 
letters written to answer them, the number of market orders, etc. At the beginning, this 
form of tableau de bord was not very well formalised but, gradually, the management 
asked for more data in the shape of tables or cards. Comparisons year by year were also 
expected from branches. Furthermore, the Crédit Lyonnais corporate managers claimed 
for obtaining the same data than other French banks such as the Société Générale; 
probably showing their interest in benchmarking. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as  followed. The first part describes the 
devices used by the Crédit Lyonnais top managers to control their organization. These 
devices looked like a prototype of the French Tableau de Bord. In the second part of the 
paper, we try to find the reasons why the bank top management developed them. 
Did the Crédit Lyonnais apply a prototype of the tableau de bord?
 4 
Combining the normative and the cognitive approaches, we can defined the French 
tableaux de bord as a system of indicators that aim at monitoring and conducting 
economic operations and individual behaviours in a compatible way with the strategy. 
The tableau de bord is generally considered as a supplement to financial and accounting 
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measures. It has to gather, in a same device (paper sheet, log or, today, electronic 
spreadsheet) quantitative and qualitative data as well as financial data
5.  
In this sense, the Crédit Lyonnais did not implement the tableau de bord. Yet, what we 
have found in the archives can be considered as a prototype or, at least, historical traces. 
These traces of tableau de bord were observed at each level of the bank: branch offices 
(“succursales”),  local branches (“agences”) and offices (“bureaux”).  Two kinds of 
data were collected: accounting data and non financial indicators. 
 
Accounting and financial reporting 
The correspondence between Crédit Lyonnais top managers shows that, since 1874, 
each local branch had to produce a  monthly  inventory. This document must be sent 
every month before the 20
th of the following month. There were many discussions about 
the way to present the inventories: what kinds of data were considered as useful? How 
to measure these data? Hostache, the Chief Financial Officer, Letourneur, the managing 
director before 1883, Adrien Mazerat, the managing director after 1883 and Germain, 
the Chief Executive Officer were much involved in these discussions.  
Furthermore,  Henri Germain  really wanted to standardize the financial reporting 
(Praquin, 2003).  In 1876,  he insisted to  be given inventories  that would  allow 
comparisons with previous years:  
“Our president asks you to recommend to the local branches under your 
responsibility, to add in their monthly inventory the comparison with the two last 
years” [memo from the head office to the local branch of Paris, 02-11-1876]. 
Since 1878, Henri Germain  required  weekly reports from each local branch. The 
inventories must be established Friday and arrived Monday at the head office. Showing 
the difficulty to establish them, there was a huge amount of letters from the  local 
branches requesting an exemption. Weekly reports were consolidated at the head office 
under the form of an income statement; but local entities had to produce it every week. 
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Exhibit 1 – Consolidated weekly report 
 
But, Henri Germain wanted more than accounting and financial figures; he expected 
justification also: 
“Our president orders to join explanations from the director for the monthly 
inventories of each local branch. He believes that explanations are necessary to 
account for what profits and losses are made of” [memo from branch office of 
Paris to the head office at Lyon, 03-18-1876]. 
Besides, the analysis of accounting reports of the Crédit Lyonnais at this period showed 
that an organized system was implemented. The offices report to local agencies. Then 
local agencies report to branch offices. At the end, branch offices report to the head 
office. Two main points characterized this system: the involvement of the CEO and the 
will to standardize accounting data (Praquin, 2003). Non financial indicators played a 
major role in the completion of the new system. 
Non financial indicators 
The archival research has brought to light the existence of different sets of indicators 
implemented during certain periods of time and containing various types of data.    6 
Between 1873 and 1881, a dossier entitled “compared statistics” (“statistiques 
comparées”) enclosed an assortment of physical indicators expected by the head office 
from branches: 
-  deposit accounts (half year or monthly averages, paid interests); 
-  number of accounts; 
-  number of posted letters; 
-  number of transactions (cash and futures) & number of customers; 
-  number of letters and internal notes (per types) & number of new accounts – to 
justify an increase if need be; 
-  deposits and securities; 
-  coupon payment; 
-  number of people going to the counter; 
-  number of customers, number of claim letters and answers; 
-  market orders 
Furthermore, headquarter asked for information through other channels. For instance, a 
table entitled “work comparison in departments” compared two years, 1875 and 1876, 
with the variance, positive or negative, indicated in two columns.  
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Exhibit 2 – Work comparison in departments in 1876 
 
The indicators enclosed in this table didn’t intersect exactly the set of indicators called 
statistics – see above. Here, indicators were of two types: monetary and physical and 
they were more systematic, as we can find, for a same component, the monetary figure 
as well as the physical figure. Even if there was no ratio yet.  
The main characteristic of the period is the need for information of all nature (financial 
and physical) but this need was not really coordinated. The forms changed, they were 
not regular and senior managers accepted flexibility. 
In 1879 and 1880, the “statistics” took a new form: the head office sent to branches 
formatted sheet to fill in.   8 
Exhibit 3 – Statistics: number of received letters, posted letters and people coming at the counter; number 
of people coming at the cashier’s desk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For  the year  1879, a daily comparison was made for three indicators: number of 
customers at the counter, number of received letters and numbers of posted letters.  
In a memo dated from January 1880, Jacques Letourneur asked for tables to be filled in. 
Yet, he made clear that all the tables  were not relevant for all branches, and that 
branches could provide other information than expected. 
Enclosed with this memo, a range of blank tables were provided 
-  paid coupons; 
-  securities fluctuations; 
-  market orders; 
-  cash flow; 
-  posted letters; 
-  deposit accounts; 
(…) 
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Exhibit 4 – A blank table to fill in with information about market orders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
They had been sent to each branch offices and branches including those abroad. The 
blank sheets were to be informed for 2 years, 1877 and 1880, covering a period during 
which the business had increased. The memo mentioned that the head office would 
consolidate all the figures arriving. In addition, the CEO expected them quickly: 
“Our President wishes that these statistics were sent to him promptly after 
accounting books are closed on December 31 and, for personal reasons, he 
recommends that they are closed this year as soon as possible” [head office 
memo, 12-27-1880] 
Moreover, one of the reasons that motivated those demands was explicitly mentioned: 
“We allow ourselves to insist so that our branches provide the expected 
information; otherwise our work wouldn’t be comparable with the other 
companies and will miss its goal. The Société Générale, for instance, doesn’t do 
doublets in its statistics” [head office memo 5-1-1881] 
Thus, the accuracy of data was crucial as far as other banks demonstrated that it is 
possible. It also suggests that one the purpose of statistical work could be comparison 
not only between branches and departments, but also with competitors. The Société 
Générale is adverted several times in the archival documents.   10 
In January 1881, Henri Germain asked for completing data for year 1872 showing his 
interest for time comparison. 
Various types of data collected (financial and physical), different sequences of time 
covered, time comparison as well as  departments’ comparison, benchmarking with 
competitors: it seems that the Crédit Lyonnais implemented a kind of tableau de bord. 
However, it would be premature to conclude on this point. Because indicators were not 
systematic; nor gathered in a same sheet. On the other hand, they represented a basic 
form of it; f or they had important features. Firstly, they were required by the Crédit 
Lyonnais corporate level. Secondly, they were expected from each branch offices. 
Thirdly, indicators were filled in each month between 1873 and 1881 and were 
sometimes used for comparison. The next step will consist in looking at the reasons why 
the Crédit Lyonnais had put in use those devices. 
 
Why do senior bank managers need more than financial and accounting figures? 
The unveiling of what could be the traces of one of the first forms of tableaux de bord 
raises another series of questions: firstly, the relationship between the emergence of the 
new device and the characteristics of the Crédit Lyonnais is an avenue that has to be 
explored; secondly, the point in doing so, demanding physical data, has to be 
established and highlighted.  
The characteristics of The Crédit Lyonnais 
During the years following its foundation, the Crédit Lyonnais presented four features. 
The first two, strategy and structure, and risks, were not noticeably original: “Actually, 
the Crédit Lyonnais doesn’t come close to any invention spirit (…) [it] implemented 
deliberately some ideas about banking organisation in France; but, those ideas were 
widely spread, put into practice in other banks” (Bouvier, 1961, pp 97). Bouvier 
mentions two “models”: English banks and Parisian Crédit Industriel et Commercial. 
The two other features were more specific: the bicephalous head office and the 
personality of the CEO and founder, Henri Germain. 
Firstly, a strategy and structure issue comes into sight. The Crédit Lyonnais had been 
established around an innovative strategy: the new branch banking system allowed   11 
deposits from everyone, with a minimal amount of money, but accessible. It produced 
quite mechanically a structuring made of a network of branch offices (“succursales”), 
local branches (“agences”) and even offices (“bureaux”), from the larger to the smaller 
ones. The bank located numerous offices in France. Germain wanted to “settle in every 
important location and reach everywhere a position that places Crédit Lyonnais 
branches as the most powerful in each district” (Rivoire, p.55). In 1881, there were 110 
local branches in France (Praquin, 2003). 
In addition, the Crédit Lyonnais distinguished itself with a precocious international 
development. The network was not only dispersed, but wide also. Numerous local 
branches were opened all around the world: London, Vienna, St.-Petersburg, New York, 
Constantinople, Algiers, Oran, Madrid, Alexandria, and Geneva (Dagneau, 1977).  
Secondly, specific risks appeared with this strategy and structure choice. The 
dissemination and the width of the network caused risks in themselves. As Dagneau 
(1977) points out, there is a close link between the possibilities of the network 
existence, its expansion, the means of control and confidence. 
Thirdly, the Crédit Lyonnais had a bicephalous management. The historical head office 
was located in Lyon. However, during the period studied, the power centre moved from 
Lyon to Paris: “the strategic leadership of the firm got away from Letourneur. Since 
1871, major strategies were decided in Paris” (Bouvier, 1968, p.118). Officially, “this 
contradictory situation was officially resolved in 1882: Mazerat became managing 
director (directeur général) and Letourneur was posted as a deputy managing director in 
Lyon (administrateur délégué à Lyon)” (Bouvier, 1968, p . 124).  
Fourthly, Henri Germain as a real  entrepreneur, having created his own bank, was 
intensely involved in management. He asked for a lot of accounting and non financial 
information and he insisted for obtaining them on time:  
“I hope that Monday the mail will bring us the modified inventories for 1876. 
Our president is becoming in a very bad mood. […] Please, hurry up. Between 
you and me, it is really not funny. He is all day at the office and each hour he 
has a new idea and it is a new job we must realize immediately” [letter from 
Paris head office to Lyon, 01-27-1878]   12 
The personality of the CEO was of a real importance in the completion of innovative 
managerial devices.  
Yet, this powerful presence had a counterpart:  the shareholders. If Henri Germain 
wanted to run his business with a strong  commitment, he had to meet shareholders 
expectations. As Letourneur described it, in a Protestant manner, the account book had 
to include some documents:  
“First document: profit and loss account dedicated to Israel children, the Chosen 
Ones. This document, divided into columns, indicates the credit and debit of each 
account of the income statement. Second document: the same with expenses and 
receipts are gathered (dedicated to the Gentiles). We will elaborate together a third 
document dedicated to Philistines, that are shareholders, when the two firsts will 
be screened” (Bouvier, 1961, p. 164). 
Thus,  Letourneur  suggested segregating information from the very top bank 
management (“the Chosen Ones”) to the shareholders (the “Philistines”) through middle 
management (the Gentiles). If a hierarchy was clearly made, everyone must have its 
own relevant information. 
The CEO was also aware of this need for information to shareholders: 
 “Our President has thought that, because of the extension of our operations 
since  3 years, it would be interesting to disclose in our report to the next 
ordinary general meeting of shareholders statistical figures pointing the 
fluctuations or our operations for each of the departments of our company” 
[head office memo, 12-27-1880] 
Therefore, when strategic objectives met shareholders expectations with the support of a 
very involved CEO, a new managerial device could emerge in order to reconcile the 
needs of everyone. Moreover, the expenses specific structure of the banking activity 
also accounts for the development of such devices. 
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The bank core issue: overheads (“les frais généraux”)
6  
Banking operations, especially in deposit banks, produced a considerable amount of 
overhead expenses: employees, office stationary, etc. constituted the major costs of the 
activity. Facing this issue, the senior managers of the Crédit Lyonnais tried not only to 
implement a reporting system, but also to understand the pattern of their activation.  
Exhibit 5 – Overhead categorization 
 
Overheads were not only considered as monetary calculable expenses not really 
controllable. On the contrary, they were conceived as the result of a relationship 
between those expenses and their “drivers” such as the number of customers, the 
number of complaints, etc. 
A file entitled “Costs and department productivity for the year 1876” includes a “Survey 
for the reduction of operating costs and the increase of production”. Senior managers 
wanted to put an end to free services offered to customers and branches complied and 
did their best: 
“In a word, since one year, free services are excluded from our minds and our 
departments and, you will notice, in the tables that we will send you next week that 
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this new policy, since last year in April, has produced fruits yet. From this point, 
do you want to do more?” [memo from the Paris branch office, 2-16-1877]  
However, they feared the loss of customers, “puzzled” by this policy, in favour of other 
banks and for, at last, a “petty” result. 
Regardless this concern, the senior management pursued this course of action. A memo 
dated from March 6 1877 advocated for a “diminution of overhead expenses”. Facing 
the clientele growth, which was the major objective of the bank since its creation, it 
asked how to improve productivity while most of the services are free. 
From 1881 to 1885, we found in the archives a file labelled “Overheads” in which 
financial figures were collected as well as some indicators: number of employees, 
average salary, and other overheads per branch and per work station. In 1883, a series of 
memos, emanated from the CEO, claimed for an overheads reporting and in particular 
for review expenses (“inspection”) and branch offices manager wages. Adrien Mazerat 
insisted in a note the year after: 
“Our President recommends constantly that we always make possible reductions 
in our overheads and not to neglect all the minor savings, even if they look 
unimportant” [2-1-1884]. 
The memo referred to a “ program” showing that the overheads reduction policy was 
essential to senior management. It also entered very minutiae: for instance, the 
consumption of paper and relate expenses are deemed too high. The use of single sheets 
is recommended instead of double ones. 
“Our President thinks that we must have for all this details rules as strict as in 
households and railways [sic] which regulate all their expenses in a deep economy 
spirit” [Memo from Mazerat, 2-1-1884]. 
In a memo dated from March 1884, the CFO Hostache asked for the branches 1883 
overhead expenses. 15 natures of expenses were concerned such as number of accounts, 
number of employees, amounts of deposit, employee wages. If no correlation was made 
between these elements, the idea of put them together reveals that they are implicitly 
related. 
Besides, some other documents show that the top management had the connection at 
least in mind:   15 
“Here are my thoughts about the profit and loss account at June 30 (…): 
concerning overhead expenses, I consider that Mâcon [a Burgundy located 
branch] with 22 employees shouldn’t spend more than 35000 Francs” [Memo 
from Germain to Mazerat, 8-3-1883] 
Nevertheless, the message had difficulty to go through the branch network:  
“Our branches managers are too confident and let customers circumvent them too 
easily. We need more wary and severe characters” [Memo from Mazerat to 
Letourneur, 1-8-1886]
7. 
So these executives were capable to connect overhead expenses with drivers even if 
these are rudimentary. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this paper, we have tried to describe how a French bank put into practice innovative 
managerial devices in order to control a network organisation but also to model the 
relationships between expenses and their causes. These devices supported a strategy 
which was to balance good quality customers’ services and financial performance.  
The first contribution of this paper is to highlight the role of banking in the development 
of the French tableaux de bord. Industry was not the only hearth of this typical device. 
It is shown that in services too a real reflexion was conducted about the way to monitor 
local entities. Network organization nurtured the implementation of managerial devices 
which allowed the observation and control of distant and quite autonomous branches. 
Adding the powerful presence at this time of a charismatic and rather authoritarian CEO 
and the need for a system that gave the possibility to run a deposit banking business and 
to consolidate information for shareholders becomes obvious. The growth and scattering 
of the Crédit Lyonnais activities and entities justified the elaboration of a prototype of 
tableau de bord. It was the same in the industry but later because those two 
phenomenons occurred after World War I (Pezet, 2007). 
The second contribution of our paper is  to show how  Crédit Lyonnais managers 
connected overhead expenses and their causes. It would be excessive to conclude here at 
the emergence of activity based costing. On the other hand, the idea of driver is 
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interesting to understand how those managers modelled their banking activities. 
Furthermore, they related this modelling with strategic decision such as the elimination 
of free services. Here again, it is noticeable that in-house decisions lead to performance 
for shareholders. 
Finally, the case of the Crédit Lyonnais recounts how managerial devices were designed 
in order to remote distant and numerous entities and to meet shareholders requirements. 
The ideal of integration of the tableau de bord, both top-down and bottom-up was, at 
least partially, reached. 
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